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LIMITATIONS ON REPRODUCTIVE AUTONOMY
FOR THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED
George P. Smith II*
In the United States, sterilizations are performed almost exclusively with
the subject's consent today.' This is not to suggest, however, that all
problems associated with the approval of the procedure itself have disap-
peared. The concerns are, however, decidedly different.2 The principal con-
cern is whether the procedures are truly voluntary. Classically, the
individual who is to undergo the intervention is mentally incapable of giving
a valid and informed consent to the operation. Here, the law's objective is to
obtain a valid, substituted consent and cause to place in being those neces-
sary standards and protections designed to assure that whatever ultimate
medical decision is made is not only justified medically but also is in the best
interest of the subject.3 Thus, a decision made in full accordance with these
criteria would ideally complement or be in agreement with the patient's very
own decision if he were competent to make it. Regrettably, this ideal is not
always realized, with both the laws and the practices falling short of the
ideal.4
Of particular testing relevance here is the nature and dimension of "volun-
tariness" for sterilization of children under statutes specifying no minimum
age and its performance on persons within institutional environments who
give an informed consent only as a condition of discharge.5 Although since
the 1960's these problems have largely been resolved in the United States,
the potential remains for such abuse of the principle of "voluntariness" -
especially so as the rationales for sterilizations begin to shift more from
eugenics to parenthood and considerations of public welfare.6 As observed,
"[t]he fact that some of the cases involved persons of normal mental compe-
tence and that some of the statutes aimed at the mentally incompetent - an
* B.S., J.D., Indiana University; L.L.M., Columbia University; Professor of Law, Cath-
olic University of America.
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infinitely more vulnerable group - endorse these new rationales shows that
there is no reason to be complacent.",
7
"Normalization" or, the development of skills that thereby enable a men-
tally retarded person to live in an autonomous or independent environment
and be as self-sufficient as possible, is the goal of modem mental health pro-
grams.8 This ideal goal of de-institutionalization has resulted in a signifi-
cant number of the mentally disabled being forced to live - because of their
physical and economic circumstances - with their parents.9 Even with
these growing efforts to place the de-institutionalized in local neighborhood
or community environments, and thus curtail the costs of institutional main-
tenance, it is instructive to review, from an economic standpoint, the societal
costs incurred in dealing with the mentally handicapped.
Unrestricted genetic transmission forces a heavy burden upon society.
The Juke and Kallikak family histories reveal clearly this point. Max Juke
resided in Ulster County, New York. He had two sons who married two of
six sisters of a local feeble-minded family. One other sister left the area; the
other three married mental defectives. From these five sisters, 2,094 direct
descendants and 726 consortium descendants were traced by 1915 into four-
teen states. All of them were feeble-minded and the cost to society from
their welfare payments, illicit enterprises, jail terms, and prostitution broth-
els was $2,516,685.00.10
Martin Kallikak, Sr. fostered a son, Martin Jr., by a feeble-minded girl
during the Revolutionary War. Martin Jr. married a feeble-minded girl and
they, in turn, had seven children: five of whom were similarly afflicted.
From these progeny sprung 480 descendants, 143 feeble-minded, 46
normals, and 291 of unknown mental stature. When Martin Sr. returned
from the War, he married a normal woman and started a line culminating in
496 descendants, all of whom were normal."1
Thirty percent of all hospitalized children have genetic diseases and six
percent of the United States population is afflicted with some form of genetic
ailment.12 Various estimates have been made relative to the lifetime costs of
various genetic diseases - often with rather astonishing results. For exam-
7. Id. (footnotes omitted). See generally Mclvor, Equitable Jurisdiction to Order Steril-
izations, 57 WASH. L. REV. 373 (1982).
8. Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights and Family Pri-
vacy, 1986 DUKE L. J. 806, 815. See Wolfensbrueger, The Principle of Normalization and Its
Implication to Psychiatric Services, 127 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 291 (1970).
9. Scott, supra note 8, at 808.
10. J. WALLIN, MENTAL DEFICIENCY 43-44 (1956).
11. Id. at 44-45.
12. Nat'l. Inst. for Medical Sciences, 1987: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of Comm. on
Appropriations of House of Reps., 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1093 (1987).
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pie, it has been calculated that the lifetime costs of maintaining a seriously
defective individual is $250,000.00; this assumes, of course, institutionaliza-
tion. Conservative estimates place the number of new cases of Down's Syn-
drome in the United States at five thousand or, one in every seven hundred
live births. Using the $250,000.00 figure for the cost of maintenance, the
lifetime committed expenditure for new cases of Down's Syndrome standing
alone comes to at least $1.25 billion yearly, a staggering figure for but one
disease entity.13 It is estimated that it costs a family with a Tay-Sachs child
between twenty and forty thousand dollars a year for the child's four to five
years of misery. 14
Another way of calculating the toll of genetic disease is to estimate the
future life years costs. One widely cited estimate indicates that thirty-six
million future life years are listed in the United States by birth defects -
putting the figure for recognized genetic disease (eighty percent of birth de-
fects being genetic in whole or in part) at twenty-nine million future years
lost, or several times as much as from heart disease, cancer and stroke.' 5
Mentally retarded parents have become the focus of an intense and far-
ranging debate not only among psychologists and social workers, but educa-
tors and lawyers as well. 6 The question put simply is: can individuals with
unusually low intelligence quotients ever be "good" parents? The next two
questions are linked inextricably with the first and ask: will educational or
vocational training be of any real positive assistance for retarded parents
who seek to give a minimum level of care to their offspring and, if not, when
should the state enter and remove the children from their parental environ-
ments?' 7 Stephen Greenspan, an educational psychologist at the University
of Connecticut, raises an interesting issue: namely, since decisions about fit
parenting, or more specifically who should be a parent, are not made on the
basis of age, income or race, why then should it be based on one's intelli-
gence quotient? An obvious reply is that without a properly functioning
mind, one is not only unable to take proper care of oneself but, as in parent-
ing, runs the risk (genetic and/or social) of hindering or preventing an off-
13. U.S. Dep't. of Health, Education & Welfare, What Are The Facts About Genetic
Disease?, (1978). See also, supra note 12.
14. Note, The Constitutionality of Mandating Genetic Screening, 31 CASE W. RES. 897,
900 n.27 (1981).
15. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, supra note 13. See, G. SMITH,
GENETICS, ETHICS AND THE LAW, (1981); Smith, Genetics, Eugenics and Public Policy, 1986
S. ILL. L. REV. 435. See generally G. RODERICK, MAN AND HEREDITY (1968); H. PAPAZIAN,
MODERN GENETICS (1967); A. SCHEINFELD, YOUR HEREDITY AND ENVIRONMENT (1965).
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spring from achieving intellectual independence and thus results in a heavy
economic burden to the state and its taxpayers."8
The children of retarded parents may, in turn, become as handicapped as
their parents because of improper intellectual and social stimulation in the
home environment. And, statistics confirm the fact that, when parents are
retarded, there is a higher risk of child abuse and neglect resulting. Because
of the intellectual inadequacies of the parents, the children of mentally re-
tarded persons who might have an opportunity for "normalization" are oft-
entimes grid-locked into mediocrity and become models of their parents.
When children are cognizant of the intellectual limitations of their parents,
the rather normal rebellious attitudes of adolescence oftentimes become ma-
jor problems.19
Even though the institutional cost of maintenance of the mentally handi-
capped during the 1970's is, now with de-institutionalization, curtailed by
public health care expenditures for medication and physical care, supervi-
sory assistance, and maintenance of the group or half-way rehabilitation
homes for the retarded individuals, it could be argued that these expendi-
tures are small, compared with the societal advantage of allowing citizens to
become useful or at least semi-useful individuals. Commendable though this
posture may be, the specter of the "Kallikak saga" is still ever-present and,
accordingly, raises the question of what society does if and when two men-
tally handicapped individuals, married or unmarried, have a child. If such a
hypothetical couple were to find themselves in this condition, and unable to
care for themselves, the extra burden placed upon society to not only give
the couple lifetime care but, additionally, to be responsible for raising the
child (who itself might suffer genetic deficiencies) raises the vexatious ques-
tion of whether mentally retarded individuals should be limited in their pro-
creative freedoms. Stated otherwise, would it not be in the best interests of
the retarded individuals, their potential offspring and society to prevent this
scenario from being written? Economic costs are, in reality, but one factor
in resolving this problem.
A recent dilemma for a young California couple illustrates the larger soci-
etal frustration and difficulty in dealing with the expanding rights and the all
too neglected responsibilities of disabled Americans in general.2" Tony Rios
is a young thirty-four year old man confined to a wheelchair because of a
18. Id.
19. Id. For a model statute designed to provide protection of the handicapped's right to
reproductive freedom see B. SALES, D. POWELL & R. VANDuIZEND, DISABLED PERSONS
AND THE LAW at 77-84. (1982).
20. See Poor Disabled Couple Fights to Regain Child, Wash. Post, Nov. 28, 1987, at 1, col.
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severe case of juvenile rheumatoid arthritis and congenital defects that in-
clude stunted arms. His wife Tiffany is twenty years old, has cerebral palsy
and is also confined to a wheelchair. Because of their handicaps, both live
on state and federal welfare funds. Already the parents of an eight month
old son, the Rios' will soon have a second child. The county welfare author-
ities determined that the couple could see their healthy young son only for
an hour each Saturday morning, with the fate of the second child yet to be
decided. Both Tony and Tiffany each receive $520.00 in monthly welfare
payments and additionally some forty hours a week of care from county-
paid attendants. While the couple are looking for employment, neither has
found it. Tony has a high school education, while Tiffany has only com-
pleted the tenth grade. The couple was once legally separated.21
The presiding judge of the county juvenile court, Leonard P. Edwards,
while sympathetic to the plight of the Rios' family observed that "the prob-
lem was lack of public money for special care."' 22 Specifically, the judge
stated: "The question is, in a world of limited resources, should you devote a
large percentage of resources to one family, or do you spread those resources
around to a number of families?"23
While the tragedy of the Rios' family is just that, a tragedy, it may well be
compounded for them, their children and the state over the years to come.
If they were to stay together as a married couple and have additional chil-
dren, born healthy or unhealthy, the social costs to the children of being
raised in the Rios' home environment would be considerable. The economic
costs to society, that is, of maintaining them individually and their offspring
during their lifetimes could be astronomical. Under circumstances of this
nature, it would surely be within the limits of a sound public policy to edu-
cate those handicapped capable of education, as with the Rios family, that
responsible child planning is a part of responsible citizenship; or, stated
otherwise, that for every right of citizenship there is a coordinate duty that
dictates the right be exercised reasonably (from the standpoint of economic
efficiency) and responsibly.
In a related case in the District of Columbia, but not as complicated, two
21. Id. at 8, col. 1.
22. Id.
23. Id. The Santa Clara County Social Services Department decided that Tiffany and
Tony's first child, David, who was eleven months of age, was to placed with a foster family
interested in adoption. The second son - one month old Jesse - was initially also placed in
the same foster home as his brother but was removed subsequently to an emergency shelter
because of the inability of the "foster" parents to care for him. Tiffany is now seeking a di-
vorce from Tony. Disabled Mother's Woes Increase, Wash. Post, Feb. 29, 1988, at A4, col. 3.
See generally Note, Unhappy Families: Special Considerations in Custody Cases Involving
Handicapped Children, 24 J. FAM. L. 59 (1985-86).
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mentally retarded individuals, with IQ's under 70 (100 is considered typi-
cal), Donna and Ricardo Thornton, were featured in an episode of the popu-
lar CBS Sunday evening news program "60 Minutes," highlighting the
plight of the mentally retarded in raising families.24 In the District, no spe-
cific reference is made to whether mentally retarded persons may marry.25
A spokesman for the District of Columbia Association for Retarded Citizens
stated marriage is treated as a contractual relation entered into by two com-
petent people. He stated "[o]nce you reach age 18, you're assumed to be
competent unless someone raises the issue and you're judged by a court to be
incompetent."26
Prior to the birth of their child, the Thortons were wards of the District
government. They were discharged subsequently, but continue to receive
social services and to live in an apartment complex supervised by a nonprofit
group that assists mentally retarded people in housekeeping duties, grocery-
shopping, etc..27
II.
Modern cases support the proposition that marital and procreative deci-
sions fall within a constitutionally protected zone of privacy.2" As long ago
as 1941, the United States Supreme Court declared that man possesses the
basic civil right to have offspring.29 More recently, the Court has held that
the choice of whether to give birth is within a constitutionally protected zone
of privacy.30 These broad pronouncements do not force the conclusion,
24. Gaines-Carter, Retarded District Couple Awaits Birth of 1st Child: Some States Re-
strict Right to be Parents, Wash. Post, July 1, 1986, at BI, col. 1; Tiny Boy is Born to Retarded
Couple Seen on "60 Minutes," Wash. Post, Dec. 8, 1986, at B3, col. 1.
25. Gaines-Carter, supra note 23, at BI, col. 2.
26. Id. at BI, col. 2 - BS, col. 1.
27. Id. at B5, col. 1. See Shaman, Persons Who are Mentally Retarded. Their Right to
Marry, in 2 LEGAL, ETHICAL AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES TO A BRAVE NEW WORLD 214 (G.
Smith ed. 1982) where the author argues for their right to marry and not have this right
conditioned on sterilization. See also, Brakel, supra note 1, at 510-515 (for an analysis of the
legal effect of prohibited marriages); Id. at 532-538 (for a state-by-state analysis of this issue).
See generally Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and
Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 412-13 (1983).
28. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452-55 (1972) (forbidding - on morality
grounds - sale or gift of contraceptives to unmarried persons conflicts with fundamental con-
stitutional rights); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (state may not infringe freedom to
marry person of another race); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-486 (1965) (statute
forbidding use of contraceptives violates constitutionally protected right of marital privacy).
29. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). Concurring in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, Justice- Goldberg commented that a compulsory birth control law unjustifiably would
abridge the constitutional rights of marital privacy. 281 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (with Goldberg,
J., Warren, C.J., & Brennan, J. concurring).
30. See Roe v. Wade, 419 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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however, that all restrictions on reproduction are per se unconstitutional. If
a state may prevent a person from marrying more than one person at a time,
should it not have the same power to prevent a person from having more
than one or two children? The right to procreate may not include a right to
breed without some restrictions.3 Societal interests may be sufficiently pow-
erful to justify at least some regulation for limitations on reproduction.32
Some legal precedents do uphold the constitutionality of eugenic steriliza-
tion. In Buck v. Bell,33 the Supreme Court of the United States upheld a
Virginia statute providing for sterilization of inmates committed to state sup-
ported institutions who were found to have a hereditary form of insanity or
imbecility.34 And still, today, a good number of the states have some form
of compulsory sterilization legislation3 5 - with the courts typically uphold-
ing the validity of actions brought thereunder.36
31. Golding & Golding, Ethical and Value Issues in Population Limitation and Distribu-
tion in the United States, 24 VAND. L. REV. 495, 511 (1971).
32. Id. at 512. The authors conclude, however, that the unrestricted freedom to procreate
should be abridged only for a "good of momentous order." Id.
33. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
34. Id. at 207. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, stated:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens
for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call on those who already sap the
strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those
concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for
all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let
them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit
from continuing their kind.
Id. See also In re Sterilization of Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 307 (1976).
35. The present eugenic sterilization statutes are: CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West 1970);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5701 (1983); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-3901 to-3910 (1985); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 34B §§ 7001-17 (Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 252A.13 (West 1982);
MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-45-1 to -19 (1981 & Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-5-501 to -
505 (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-36-to-50 (1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 436.205 to -.335
(1983); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-47-10-44-47-100 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 64-10-1-16
(1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 8701-16 (1968 & Supp. 1986); VA. CODE §§ 54-325.15
(1982); W. VA. CODE §§ 27-16-1 to -5 (1986). It has been estimated that over 70,000 people
have been sterilized under such statutes. STATISTICS FROM HUMAN BETTERMENT Ass'N. OF
AMERICA, SUMMARY OF U.S. STERILIZATION LAWS 2 (1958).
One should distinguish these eugenic sterilization statutes from those sterilization statutes
which are wholly voluntary in nature. Among the voluntary statutes are: GA. CODE ANN. §§
84-932 (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-271 to -275 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-1-14, 24-9-
1 (1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.305 (1987). These statutes are essentially contraceptive and
therapeutic and not eugenic in nature.
36. See, e.g., Oregon v. Cook, 9 Or. App. 224, 230, 495 P.2d 768, 771-72 (1972) (equal
protection challenge based on indigency rejected); In re Cavitt, 182 Neb. 712-21, 157 N.W.2d
171, 178 (1968), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 996 (1970). See Sherlock & Sherlock, Sterilizing
the Retarded: Constitutional, Statutory and Policy Alternatives, 60 N.C.L. REV. 943 (1982).
See also, Dunn, Eugenic Sterilization Statutes: A Constitutional Re-evaluation, 14 J. FAM. L.
280 (1975).
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The extension of Buck to sterilization of carriers of recessive defective
genes cannot be accomplished without difficulty. Since its decision in that
case, the Court has increasingly recognized the right to marry and have chil-
dren as a basic or fundamental right and that a state must show a compelling
interest in order to justify any abridgement of the right itself.37 Several fac-
tors seem to indicate that the state interest is not as compelling with regard
to sterilization of carriers of defective genes as it is with regard to mental
incompetents. A mental incompetent may well be unable to be an adequate
parent, and the burden of care therefore would fall upon the state.38 More-
over, the sterilization of mental incompetents in institutions can be said to
benefit them directly in that it "enable[s] those who otherwise must be kept
confined to be returned to the world . . .,,3 The Court seemed to have
assumed in Buck, however, that there is a strong likelihood that the child of
an intellectually defective mother would in fact inherit the same defect'
even though the child of two heterozygous individuals has only a one in four
chance of exhibiting that defective trait.4 '
The distinguishing features of Buck v. Bell do not indicate that the state
cannot offer compelling justification to warrant mandatory restriction on re-
production. Such justifications can be found in society's interest in the re-
duction of human suffering, and in safeguarding the health and welfare of its
citizens in the allocation of economic resources and in population control.42
In Buck, Justice Holmes stressed that, "[i]t is better for all the world ... if
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their
kind.",4 3 Perhaps world conditions have become so complex and resources
so valuable that society now has a compelling interest in restricting repro-
37. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
38. See Oregon v. Cook, 9 Or. App. 224, 230, 495 P.2d 768, 771-72 (1972).
39. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 202, 208 (1927). The Court's rationale acquires additional
significance because it became the basis for distinguishing Buck in the case of Skinner v.
Oklahoma where the High Court invalidated a statute providing for the sterilization of habit-
ual criminals. The Skinner Court concluded that the questioned statute violated the four-
teenth amendment's equal protection clause. See 316 U.S. at 542 (1942).
40. The statute challenged in Buck required only that experience demonstrate that hered-
ity plays an important role in the transmission of the mental defect. See 274 U.S. at 206. The
inmate involved, however, was the daughter of a feebleminded mother. Id. at 205.
See generally, Murray, Marriage Contracts for the Mentally Retarded, 21 CATH. LAW. 182
(1975).
41. See Waltz & Thigpen, Genetic Screening and Counseling: The Legal and Ethical Is-
sues, 68 N.W. U.L. REV. 696, 721, n.131 (1973).
42. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). See Lamdam, The History of Human Sterilization in the United
States: Theory, Statute and Adjudication, 23 ILL. L. REV. 463 (1929); Baron, Voluntary Sterili-
zation of the Mentally Retarded, in GENETICS AND THE LAW 267 (A. Milunsky, G. Annas
eds. 1976); Rothman, Sterilizing the Poor, 14 SociETY 36 (1977).
43. 274 U.S. at 207.
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duction by those, who although not "manifestly unfit" themselves, perpetu-
ate human suffering by giving birth to genetically defective offspring.
In attempting to fill the significant statutory vacuum found within the
whole scheme of procedural protections applicable to sterilization proceed-
ings, and to distinguish or define when procedure shades into substantive
standards or, more specifically, what must be alleged, shown and reviewed as
opposed to how cr who must undertake it, the courts have assumed the legis-
lative function. In the statutory void found within the State of Washington,
the Supreme Court of the state, in the case of In re Guardianship of Hayes",
prescribed the following "sterilization guidelines:"
The decision can only be made in a superior court proceeding in
which (1) the incompetent individual is represented by a disinter-
ested guardian ad litem, (2) the court has received independent ad-
vice based upon a comprehensive medical, psychological, and
social evaluation of the individual, and (3) to the greatest extent
possible, the court has elicited and taken into account the view of
the incompetent individual.
Within this framework, the judge must first find by clear, cogent
and convincing evidence that the individual is (1) incapable of
making his or her own decision about sterilization, and (2) unlikely
to develop sufficiently to make an informed judgment about sterili-
zation in the foreseeable future.
Next, it must be proved by clear, cogent and convincing evi-
dence that there is a need for contraception. The judge must find
that the individual is (1) physically capable of procreation, and
(2) likely to engage in sexual activity at the present or in the near
future under circumstances likely to result in pregnancy, and must
find in addition that (3) the nature and extent of the individual's
disability, as determined by empirical evidence and not solely on
the basis of standardized tests, renders him or her permanently in-
capable of caring for a child, even with reasonable assistance.
Finally, there must be no alternatives to sterilization. The judge
must find that by clear, cogent and convincing evidence (1) all less
drastic contraceptive methods, including supervision, education
and training, have been proved unworkable or inapplicable, and
(2) the proposed method of sterilization entails the least invasion of
the body of the individual. In addition, it must be shown by clear,
cogent and convincing evidence that (3) the current state of scien-
tific and medical knowledge does not suggest either (a) that a re-
versible sterilization procedure or other less drastic contraceptive
method will shortly be available, or (b) that science is on the
44. 93 Wash.2d 8, 608 P.2d 635, 641 (1980).
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threshold of an advance in the treatment of the individual's
disability.45
These "guidelines" are as detailed as those found in any of the sister-state
statutory classifications in other jurisdictions and are properly regarded as
the very latest in procedural "progressivism."
46
The aftermath of Hayes has seen most laws embodying "strict procedural
and substantive requirements creat[ing] a strong presumption against sterili-
zation";47 and, furthermore, presuming such a conflict of interest exists be-
tween the parent and the child as to exclude the parents from assuming a
role in decision making here.48 Thus, modem courts proceed to evaluate a
decision regarding sterilization within a formal or "semi-adversarial" pro-
ceeding where the retarded person is represented by an attorney or guardian
ad litem who is often directed to oppose the sterilization petition.49
These modem laws also seek to impose rigorous substantive criteria for
the court to assess in their deliberations.50 For example, some mandate in-
quiry into the individual's ability to reproduce 5 and whether sexual activity
is imminent. 52 Additionally, the petition is often required to present proof
that less invasive forms of contraception have been either tried or are consid-
ered infeasible.53 In some jurisdictions, the courts will evaluate a mentally
handicapped individual's capacity to care for a child which may be born
subsequently; 54 and, furthermore, require proof that the sterilization in issue
is medically essential and in the best interest of the individual's physical or
mental health.55
The following variables have been determined to be without the reach of a
court's consideration in ruling on a petition for sterilization: the need to pro-
tect the state from genetic and financial burdens imposed upon it by the
45. Id. at - The various provisions with state statutory enactment relevant to pre-hear-
ing and post hearing sterilization proceedings are presented in tabular form in Brakel, supra
note 1, at 552-57.
46. Brakel, supra note 1 at 528.
47. Scott, supra note 8, at 818.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 819.
50. Id.
51. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-78p(d) (West Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 34-B, § 7011 (West Supp. 1986).
52. E.g. UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-10-8(1)(f) (1983); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.12.A.1
(1982).
53. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 252 A.13.4 (1982); W. VA. CODE § 7-16-1 (1980).
54. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 45-78p(d) (6) (West Supp. 1983); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 54-325.12.A.4 (1982).
55. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-78p(d)(8) (West Supp. 1983); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 7013.5 (Supp. 1984).
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children of retarded persons, 5 6 parental interest in seeking to prevent the
child from an unwanted pregnancy, or avoiding the difficulties or inconve-
niences associated with hygienic menstrual practice, or wishes to reduce the
stressful situations that arise from the associated care that is given to men-
tally retarded persons who are sterilized.57 Some case determinations state
clearly that before sterilization is ordered, it must first be shown by the par-
ents that they are acting in good faith and concerned only with their child's
best interest.
58
Four types of legal rules comprise what is to be regarded as the substan-
tive criteria that, in turn, shapes ultimate decisions regarding sterilization:
(1) the "mandatory criteria" that allows a court to authorize sterilization
only where specific findings are made; (2) the more flexible "discretionary
best interest" that forces a court to evaluate or weigh a set of designated
criteria in reaching a determination regarding whether an order of steriliza-
tion is in the best interest of the incompetent person; (3) the "substituted
judgment" approach where the Hayes criteria is followed, together with any
other relevant factors considered significant to reach a decision the disabled
individual would make for himself if competent: and (4) those rules that
some courts follow merely prohibiting sterilization where it is determined
the candidate for intervention is incompetent to make an informed consent
to the procedure itself.59 The public policies behind these rules run the
gamut from protecting only the right to procreate, as with the fourth type, to
striking a balance between parentalism and state interference in the first,
second and third.6°
Since the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Stump v. Spark-
man,61 declaring an Indiana circuit court judge immune from liability for
ordering the sterilization of a "somewhat" retarded child on her mother's
petition, in a suit brought subsequently by that incompetent, the vast major-
ity of state courts before which the question has been raised have determined
their inherent equitable authority, in the absence of statute, to order steril-
izations of the mentally retarded.62
56. In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 262 n.8, 426 A.2d 467, 481 n.8 (1981); In re Terwilliger, 304
Pa. Super. 553, 564, 450 A.2d 1376, 1382 (1982).
57. Scott, supra note 8, at 822.
58. See In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 613 (Alaska 1981); In re Penny N., 120 N.H. 269,
414 A.2d 541 543 (1980); See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-78p(d)(7) (West Supp.
1986).
59. Scott, supra note 8, at 822-23.
60. Id. at 823-24. See also, Comment, Sterilization Technology and Decisionmaking: Re-
thinking the Incompetent's Right, 2 J. CONTEMP. H. L. & POL'Y. 275, 301, 304 (1986).
61. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
62. Scott, supra note 8, at 817 n.32.
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The extent to which American courts would allow themselves to allow
sterilization for purposes purely of contraception, is difficult to ascertain.
The Hayes Court guidelines63 indicate a considerable latitude for the courts
as they act under a best interest test or substituted judgment test.
64
III.
On October 23, 1986, the Canadian Supreme Court, in the case of Re
Eve,65 held that the sterilization of a twenty-four year old woman suffering
from extreme expressive aphasia could be legally sterilized.66 More specifi-
cally, the court held that a non-therapeutic sterilization, without consent, of
a mentally retarded person under its broad historical parens patriae power
can never be safely determined to be for the benefit of that person.
67
The evidence established that Eve was, unquestionably at least
mildly to moderately retarded. She has some learning skills, but
only to a limited level. She is described as being a pleasant and
affectionate person who, physically, is an adult person, quite capa-
ble of being attracted to, as well as attractive to, the opposite sex.
While she might be able to carry out the mechanical duties of a
mother, under supervision, she is incapable of being a mother in
any other sense. Apart from being able to recognize the fact of a
family unit, she would have no concept of the idea of marriage, or
indeed, the consequential relationship between intercourse, preg-
nancy and birth.6 s
Eve's mother originally made an application for permission to consent to
the sterilization of her daughter who was, as noted, mentally retarded.69
The appeal to the Supreme Court was maintained by the guardian ad litem
of Eve from a judgment by the Prince Edward Island Supreme Court al-
lowing an appeal by Eve's mother from a judgment dismissing her applica-
tion for a sterilization order.
Justice McQuaid of the Prince Edward Island Supreme Court determined
that the court had no authority or jurisdiction to authorize a surgi-
cal procedure on a mentally retarded person, the intent and pur-
63. 608 P.2d 635, 637-8 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1980).
64. See In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981); In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712 (Mass.
Sup. Ct. 1982); Re A.W., 637 P.2d 366 (Colo. Sup. Ct. 1981).
See generally, Lachance, In re Grady: The Mentally Retarded Individual's Right to Choose
Sterilization, 6 AM. J.L. & MED. 559 (1981).
65. (1987), 31 D.L.R. (4th) at 1.
66. Id. Expressive aphasia is recognized as a condition where the patient has no ability to
communicate in outward thoughts or concepts easily perceivable. Id. at 4.
67. Id. at 32.
68. Id. at 4.
69. Id. at 3.
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pose of which was solely contraceptive. It followed that, except for
clinically therapeutic reasons, parents or others similarly situated
could not give a valid consent to such a surgical procedure either,
at least in the absence of clear and unequivocal statutory
authority.7 °
In accepting this view and building upon it, Justice LaForest of the Cana-
dian Supreme Court found the proposal for Eve's sterilization was not
sought to treat any of her medical problems and, thus, the real purpose was
purely non-therapeutic. 71 Rather, the sterilization was sought in order to not
only save Eve from the trauma of the birthing process, but to relieve her
mother from the growing anxiety about the real possibility of Eve's becom-
ing pregnant and of her being saddled with the-care and ultimate responsibil-
ity for raising Eve's child.72
Justice LaForest went to considerable effort to discuss and analyze the
distinctions between the court's wardship and parens patriae powers, ac-
knowledging that with children, the chancery courts have a custodial juris-
diction that allows them to make children wards of the court, but that this
jurisdiction does not extend to mentally incompetent adult persons.73
Although the wardship cases offer a helpful guide to the exercise of the
parens patriae power in cases involving adults, the real bases of this power
over the mentally incompetent have been "lost in the mists of antiquity."74
It is thought, however, that the origins tie to either a general consensus or an
early statute pertaining to the need of the Crown to provide care for individ-
uals of unsound mind who were unable to perform their feudal duties.75 De-
spite the vagueness surrounding the historical etiology of the parens patriae
jurisdiction, it appears clear that this jurisdiction "was never limited solely
to the management and care of the estate of a mentally retarded or defective
person."' 76 Indeed, the Crown has an inherent jurisdiction to do what is for
the benefit of the incompetent. Its limits have not, and cannot, be defined.77
"Wardship of children had a quite separate origin as a property right aris-
ing out of the feudal system of tenures. The original purpose of the wardship
jurisdiction was to protect the rights of the guardian rather than of the
ward."
78
70. Id. at 5.
71. Id. at 9.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 15.
74. Id. at 14.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 16.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 14.
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The most current exercise of Canadian law based upon an exercise of the
parens patriae jurisdiction to order sterilization (here, a hysterectomy) for
therapeutic reasons for a seriously retarded child is found in the 1985 case of
Re K and Public Trustee.79 The controlling factor in the sterilization order
here "was the child's alleged phobic aversion to blood, which it was feared
would seriously affect her when her menstrual period began." 8 ° The opinion
stressed, however, that the case should not be regarded "as a precedent to be




Justice LaForest summed up his views of the instant case by observing
that,
The grave intrusion on a person's rights and the certain physical
damage that ensues from non-therapeutic sterilization without
consent, when. compared to the highly questionable advantages
that can result from it, have persuaded me that it can never safely
be determined that such a procedure is for the benefit of that per-
son. Accordingly, the procedure should never be authorized for
non-therapeutic purposes under the parens patriae jurisdiction
.*...82 it is difficult to imagine a case in which non-therapeutic
sterilization could possibly be of benefit to the person on behalf of
whom a court purports to act, let alone one in which that proce-
dure is necessary in his or her best interest.83
The Lord Lords have, obviously shown themselves to be humanely sensi-
tive, in a most reasonable and balanced manner, to an equally sensitive and
complex issue of equality of reproductive opportunity for the mentally hand-
icapped versus the responsibility of the family and the state to act respon-
sibly in implementing this right. Instead of structuring artificial distinctions
that in turn present the basic issue in black and white terms as the Canadian
Supreme Court did, the Lord Lords have demonstrated a sophisticated,
compassionate and contemporary attitude that, in turn, should influence
those jurisdictions of the common law heritage and thereby assist them in
their efforts to confront this volatile issue.
On April 30, 1987, the House of Lords held, in the case of Re B,84 that a
mentally handicapped young girl of seventeen years of age, who had a
mental age of five or six, spoke in one or two word sentences and was addi-
79. (1985), 19 D.L.R.(4th) 255, 63 B.C.L.R. 145 [1985], 4 W.W.R. 724 as cited in 31
D.L.R.(4th) at 2.
80. 31 D.L.R.(4th) at 22.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 32.
83. Id.
84. [1987] 2 All E.R. 206.
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tionally subject to epileptic seizures, could be sterilized by occlusion of the
Fallopian tubes and not hysterectomy. It was held that this was for her own
welfare and in her best interests.85 Although not capable of consenting to
marriage, B exhibited a "normal" sexual drive and it was maintained that if
she were to be given contraceptive drugs (evidence in actuality being
presented that showed it would be very difficult if not impossible to maintain
her on oral contraceptives), these would react adversely with drugs adminis-
tered presently to control her mental instability and epilepsy. Thus, sterili-
zation was the only effective intervention - outside of institutionalization,
for which there was reluctance by the local authorities to pursue, to prevent
the problems and complications attendant with motherhood for the young
girl.86 Expert evidence was adduced showing "that it was vital that she not
[be permitted to] become pregnant,"8' this being presented as such by a pe-
diatrician, a social worker and a gynecologist. The girl's mother supported
the initial application for sterilization, but the Official Solicitor, assuming the
role of the minor's guardian ad litem, opposed it. After the application was
granted, the Solicitor appealed to the Court of Appeal where his case was
dismissed. He then took his appeal to the House of Lords. 8
Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone LC, in his opinion, stressed a theme
that was developed by the other Law Lords hearing this appeal and was also
evident in the lower court considerations of the case: namely, the desire of
the authorities to afford the young girl "as much freedom as possible"8 9 so
that she could lead a "normal" life consistent with her handicap. Since she
was unable to understand and thus was unable to learn the causal relation-
ship between intercourse, pregnancy and the birth of children, it was deter-
mined she would be incapable of giving a valid consent to marriage.90
As she menstruates irregularly, pregnancy would be difficult to de-
tect or diagnose in time to terminate it easily. Were she to carry a
child to full term she would not understand what was happening to
her, she would be likely to panic, and would probably have to be
delivered by Caesarian section, but, owing to her emotional state,
and the fact that she has a high pain threshold she would be quite
likely to pick at the operational wound and tear it open. In any
event, she would be terrified, distressed and extremely violent' dur-
ing normal labor. She has no maternal instincts and is not likely to
develop any. She does not desire children, and, if she bore a child,




89. Id. at 207, 217.
90. Id. at 212.
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would be unable to care for it.9 '
The other alternatives to sterilization, incarceration and the administered
use of an oral contraceptive such as progesterone, were held by the Lords as
impractical. Incarceration would reduce B's liberty and thus "be gravely det-
rimental to the amenity and quality of her life." 92 The use of an oral contra-
ceptive over the next twenty-five or thirty years or during the period of
fertility, had "only a 40% chance of establishing an acceptable regime, and
has serious potential side effects." 93 The evidence also showed that in light
of B's dramatic shifts in mood and her considerable physical strength, "it
would not be possible" to guarantee the administration of the necessary daily
dose of contraceptive drugs. The attending social worker testified that when
B got into "one of her moods," it was impossible to "give her a pill."94
In concluding the sterilization should be ordered, Lord Hailsham found
himself in complete agreement with the trial court and the Court of Appeal
when they concluded the paramount test was whether the [sterilization] ac-
tion would advance the welfare of the young girl.95 Taking sharp issue with
the Canadian case of Re Eve 96 and Justice LaForest's distinction between
sterilizations for therapeutic and non-therapeutic purposes and his conclu-
sion that such acts should never be allowed for non-therapeutic purposes,
Lord Hailsham concluded that the LaForest position here was "in startling
contradiction[s] to the welfare principles which should be the first and para-
mount consideration in wardship cases." 97 The distinctions between thera-
peutic and non-therapeutic purposes were discounted further as "totally
meaningless" and - furthermore - "quite irrelevant to the correct applica-
tion of the welfare principle."9'
Lord Bridge of Harwich stressed, in his opinion, that the case had nothing
to do with the application of eugenic theories "or with any attempt to lighten
the burden which must fall on those who have the care of the ward. It is
concerned, and concerned only, with the question of what will promote the
welfare and serve the best interests of the ward." 99 Returning to Re Eve,
Lord Bridge referred to "the great privilege of giving birth" and concluded
in the instant case before him on appeal, that the unstable mental and physi-





95. Id. See, Grubb & Pearl, Sterilization and The Courts, 46 CAMB. J. J. 439 (1987).
96. (1986) 31 D.L.R.(4th) 1.




ing that right or enjoying that privilege."'" To allow the ward to become
pregnant "would be an unmitigated disaster."' '° Lord Brandon of Oak-
brook expressed succinctly his agreement with Lord Halisham, Lord Bridge
and Lord Oliver in agreeing to dismiss the appeal. 0 2 In elaborating upon
the procedure under which an application for sterilization could be brought,
Lord Templeman stated his opinion that the sterilization of a girl under the
age of eighteen years could only be allowed with the permission of a High
Court judge - otherwise, the physician performing the sterilization, even
with the consent of the girl's parents, could well be held liable in either crim-
inal, civil or even professional disciplinary proceedings.' 0 3 "A court exercis-
ing the wardship jurisdiction emanating from the Crown is the only
authority which is empowered to authorize such a drastic step as steriliza-
tion after a full and informed investigation.'0 4 With such a procedure, he
concluded that applications for sterilization rarely would be made.'0" He
concluded by observing that it would be "cruel" to expose the young girl in
the present appeal "to an unacceptable risk of pregnancy."'"
Finally, Lord Oliver of Aylmerton reiterated the point that the appeal had
nothing whatsoever to do with genetics and instead had but one primary
consideration: "namely the welfare and best interest of this young woman,
an interest which is conditioned by the imperative necessity of ensuring, for
her own safety and welfare, that she does not become pregnant."' 0 7 He con-
cluded his opinion by stating that he found the distinction between therapeu-
tic and non-therapeutic sterilization as structured in Re Eve to be in the
instant case "entirely immaterial," for it clouded the paramount issue of the
welfare of underage wards.'
In Australia, in the state of New South Wales, laws were approved in July,
1987 that ban the forcible sterilization of young women under eighteen years
of age with intellectual disabilities. A newly created Guardian Tribunal will
be required to rule on the feasibility of "medical procedures" being under-
taken on intellectually disabled persons over the age of sixteen years. Previ-
ous to legislation, physicians either made the decision to sterilize on their
own or - when unsure about the validity of a patient's informed consent -
100. Id. at 214.
101. Id.
102. Id
103. Id. at 214.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 215.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 219. See generally Gillon, On Sterilizing Severely Mentally Handicapped People,
13 J. MED. ETHIcS 59 (1987).
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would appeal to the Supreme Court for a decision on the issue. The effect of
these laws will be a recognition that since most intellectually disabled people
are unable to give an informed consent to a sterilization, most such women
under the age of eighteen will not be sterilized."°
CONCLUSION
The comparative approaches to grappling with the very real problem of
the mentally handicapped and both their rights and their coordinate respon-
sibilities for executing those rights in a reasonable and responsible manner
cannot conduce to one, unyielding response. Social externalities and eco-
nomic costs are a crucial and, indeed, pivotal balancing point in shaping the
extent to which reproductive rights will be recognized. A case-by-case or
situational ethic will, of necessity, guide decision makers rather than blanket
prohibitions either for or against sterilization.
It has been submitted that the concept of freedom should be viewed prop-
erly in terms of a social contract. 1 ° Thus, through the social contract, the
citizen not only endeavors to maximize his own freedom, but assumes vari-
ous societal responsibilities that, in turn, enable society to endeavor "to maxi-
mize its collective freedom." 1 " Sterilization of the mentally handicapped as
such - it has been argued further - frees the incompetent from both un-
necessary and unwanted supervision." 2
American society, while valuing freedom, also values equality -
especially of opportunity. If sterilization serves both of these ends,
it will not only make the social contract a more meaningful propo-
sition to the mentally incompetent, but it will also serve the
greater, albeit nebulous principle of justice.' '
3
In all cases, the parent-guardian should be acknowledged as the person
most able and responsible to protect and advance the best interests of the
mentally handicapped or incompetent, 4 and thus meet the conditions and
duties of the social contract. As the bulwark of society, the family unit alone
should be given the determinative role here, thereby preventing an intrusive
109. Coulthart, Forced Sterility of Girls Halted, Sydney Morning Herald, July 27, 1987, at
1, col. 2.
110. Comment, Sterilization Technology and Decisionmaking: Rethinking the Incompetent's




113. Id. See generally J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Compare Michelman, In
Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L.
REV. 962, 989 (1973).
114. Comment, Sterilization Technology, supra note 108, at 303.
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and impersonal court from confronting the problem, with the physician con-
tinuing as a "conscientious and knowledgeable check on parental activ-
ity."' 15 Reasoned analysis, not emotional passion, should be the watchword
for action in this area of concern.
115. Id. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607-10 (1979); Smith, Quality of Life, Sanctity
of Creation: Palliative or Apotheosis, 63 NEB. L. REv. 709, 740 (1984).
1988)

